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I. INTRODUCTION
The first amendment guarantees that "Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech or of the press."' Over the past
few decades, the Supreme Court has applied the first amendment to
commercial speech only sporadically.2 The Court has vacillated between
1. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
2. Commercial speech is expression that proposes a commercial transaction. Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980).
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refusing to apply the first amendment,3 liberally extending first amend-
ment guarantees,4 and applying limited first amendment protections to
commercial speech.' This expansion and contraction of first amendment
protection stems partly from three factors: (1) the Court's characteriza-
tion of the speech at issue as commercial or noncommercial, (2) the
Court's perception of the relevant regulation as content-based or con-
tent-neutral, and (3) the Court's willingness to defer to a state's judg-
ment on the necessity of imposing a restriction on commercial speech.
The Court accords commercial speech less first amendment protection
than noncommercial speech and scrutinizes regulations of commercial
speech more leniently than restrictions on noncommercial speech.6 Sim-
ilarly, the Court deems content-based restrictions more invidious than
content-neutral regulations and reviews the former more strictly than
the latter.7 Finally, the greater the deference given state judgments, the
greater the likelihood that the Court will uphold the regulation of com-
mercial expression.8
The Court has consistently scrutinized content-based regulations
3. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
4. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l,
431 U.S. 678 (1977); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
5. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S.
191 (1982); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981); Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S.
447 (1978).
6. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562-63 (stating that "[tihe Constitution ... accords a
lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression").
In Ohralik the Court stated:
To require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and noncommercial speech
alike could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the Amendment's
guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech. Rather than subject the First Amendment
to such a devitalization, we instead have afforded commercial speech a limited measure of
protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment val-
ues, while allowing modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncom-
mercial expression.
436 U.S. at 456.
7. See Virginia Board, 425 U.S. at 771 (indicating that the Court will approve mere time,
place, and manner restrictions that (1) are justified without reference to the content of the regu-
lated speech, (2) serve a significant governmental interest, and (3) leave open ample alternative
channels for communication of the information); see also Note, Restraint on Alcoholic Beverage
Advertising: A Constitutional Analysis, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 779 (1985); Comment, Standard
of Review for Regulations of Commercial Speech: Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 66 MINN.
L. REv. 903 (1982).
8. See Virginia Board, 425 U.S. at 770 (stating that "[i]t is precisely this kind of choice,
between the dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely availa-
ble, that the First Amendment makes for us"); cf. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 508 (observing that
"[i]f the city has a sufficient basis for believing that billboards are traffic hazards and are unattrac-
tive, then obviously the most direct and perhaps the only effective approach to solving the
problems they create is to prohibit them").
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on noncommercial editorial speech strictly. For example, in Pacific Gas
& Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission the Court found that
requiring a private corporation to provide a forum for opposing views
infringed on that entity's freedom of speech. 10 The Court reviews con-
tent-neutral restrictions less strictly, as in City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc." in which the Court upheld the validity of a local ordi-
nance prohibiting motion picture theaters from locating within 1000
feet of any residential zone, single or multiple family dwelling, church,
park, or school. 2
The Court applies first amendment guarantees to purely commer-
cial speech more restrictively. Thus, in Zauderer v. Office of Discipli-
nary Counsel" the Court employed an intermediate standard to review
a regulation on advertising the availability of legal services. The Court
concluded that a state may not discipline an attorney for soliciting bus-
iness through advertisements containing truthful information and ad-
vice regarding potential clients' legal rights. 4 Recently, however, the
Court has been particularly deferential toward state regulation of com-
mercial speech promoting the use of a controversial product or service.
The Court in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Company
of Puerto Rico1 5 rejected a first amendment challenge to a Puerto Rican
statute which prohibited the advertising of casinos to residents despite
the fact that gambling was legal there. 6
This Recent Development examines the degree of first amendment
protection accorded commercial speech in light of the Supreme Court's
recent decisions. Part II traces the judicial extension of constitutional
protection to commercial speech during the last decade. Part III dis-
cusses four recent cases that address whether the courts should uphold
restrictions on constitutionally protected speech. Part IV analyzes these
decisions and explores the ramifications of permitting the regulation of
commercial advertising of lawful activities. Part IV also argues that the
Court's deference toward legislative judgments prohibiting commercial
speech signals a retreat from first amendment protection of commercial
speech and a willingness to encourage the governmental paternalism
that this protection was intended to avoid. Part V stresses the need to
apply an intermediate, rather than a deferential, standard of review to
9. 106 S. Ct. 903 (1986).
10. Id. at 908.
11. 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986).
12. Id. at 926-27.
13. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
14. Id. at 647.
15. 106 S. Ct. 2968 (1986).
16. Id. at 2971.
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truthful, nondeceptive commercial speech that promotes a lawful
activity.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Commercial Speech Enters the Purview of the First Amendment
Until the last decade, traditional legal principles deemed commer-
cial speech undeserving of and exempt from the protection of the first
amendment. In rejecting first amendment challenges to restrictions on
commercial speech, the Supreme Court emphasized the commercial mo-
tivation of the advertiser rather than the content of the speech at is-
sue.17 In Valentine v. ChrestensenI the Court stated that purely
commercial advertising, properly viewed, is merely the pursuit of "gain-
ful occupation" 9 and, as such, is not entitled to first amendment
protection.20
The Court's theory that the profit motive renders commercial
speech unworthy of constitutional protection became subject to increas-
ing attack during the next few years2" as content began to assume a
greater role in the analysis of commercial speech cases. In New York
17. See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 641-45 (1951) (rejecting a first amendment chal-
lenge to a prohibition of commercial door-to-door selling of magazine subscriptions); Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 53 (1942) (rejecting a first amendment challenge to a city ordinance
banning the distribution of "commercial and business advertising matter" in the streets). See gen-
erally Note, Constitutional Protection of Commercial Speech, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 720, 722-23
(1982).
18. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). Chrestensen owned a retired United States Navy submarine that he
displayed to the public for an admission charge. A New York sanitation ordinance prohibiting the
distribution of commercial or business advertising frustrated his attempt to distribute handbills in
New York City advertising the submarine. In an effort to exempt himself from the ordinance's
coverage, he reprinted the same handbills but with a message on the reverse side protesting the
city's refusal of his request to moor the submarine at city wharfage facilities. Id. at 52-53.
19. Id. at 54.
20. Id. The Supreme Court stated that the government's ability to control the dissemination
of opinion must not be unduly burdensome, but concluded that "the Constitution imposes no such
restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising." Id. at 54. The Court rejected
Chrestensen's claim that the regulation impinged on his right to comment on a matter of public
interest, specifically the wharfage denial, and declared that Chrestensen's action was merely a sub-
terfuge to circumvent the ordinance. Id. at 55.
21. In 1959 Justice Douglas criticized the Chrestensen opinion as "casual, almost offhand
... [and one which] has not survived reflection." Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514
(1959) (Douglas, J., concurring). In a subsequent case Justice Douglas characterized Chrestensen
as "ill-conceived" and ready for overruling. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 904-06
(1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). By 1974 a majority of the Court had
expressed doubts concerning the continued viability of Chrestensen. See Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 314 n.6 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 393, 398, 401 (1973) (expressions of Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Douglas and Stewart in separate dissents); see also Note, supra note 17, at
723.
PROTECTION OF SPEECH
Times Co. v. Sullivan22 the Court decided whether the application of
state libel laws violated the first amendment. Looking beyond the
Times' commercial interest in running advertisements, the Court ex-
amined the content of the speech at issue. Finding that a civil rights
organization's advertisement communicated information about an issue
vital to the public interest, the Court deemed the advertisement worthy
of constitutional protection. 3 By distinguishing between "commercial"
and "editorial" advertising, the Court defined commercial speech in
terms of the content of the message rather than the purpose of the pro-
moter. According to the Court, editorial speech containing opinions and
information about important matters of public concern deserves full
protection .2 The Court, however, left untouched the Chrestensen dic-
tate that purely commercial speech is wholly unworthy of first amend-
ment protection.25
The progression from motive- to content-based analysis of commer-
cial speech continued with Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commis-
sion on Human Relations.26 At issue in Pittsburgh Press was the
validity of Pittsburgh's Human Relations Ordinance which prohibited
newspapers from carrying "help wanted" advertising in sex-designated
columns except when the employer or advertiser was free to make hir-
ing or employment referral decisions on the basis of sex.27 The Commis-
sion argued that the ordinance constituted a permissible regulation
because the first amendment did not protect commercial speech.2" The
Court, however, refused to characterize the speech as commercial, de-
claring that the mere fact that speech relates to an advertisement does
not render it commercial in nature.2 9 In deciding whether the speech at
issue was commercial, the Court rejected a motive-based analysis, stat-
ing that if profit motive were determinative, all facets of an entity's
operations would be subject to regulation-a result clearly at odds with
the first amendment.
30
22. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
23. The Court stated that the advertisement, which criticized police action against members
of the civil rights movement, "communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances,
protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence
and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and concern." Id. at 266.
24. Id.
25. See generally Note, First Amendment Protection for Commercial Advertising: The New
Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. CHL L. REV. 205, 209-10 (1976).
26. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
27. Id. at 378.
28. Id. at 384.
29. Id. at 384-85 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964)). By
focusing on the characterization of the speech, the Court seemed to accept the Chrestensen pre-
mise that commercial speech, properly defined, is not protected by the first amendment.
30. Id. at 385.
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The Court then distinguished purely commercial advertisements
merely proposing a commercial transaction from advertisements expres-
sing an editorial position on matters of social or political concern.3 1 In
making this distinction, the Court implicitly held that the content
rather than the motivation of the message determines whether the
speech is commercial.2 The Court, however, refused to extend first
amendment protection to the newspaper advertisements because the
content of the speech at issue proposed a transaction in violation of the
law against employment discrimination. 3
The content-based analysis assumed central importance two years
later in Bigelow v. Virginia,34 in which the Court reviewed the constitu-
tionality of a Virginia statute as applied to the publication of a New
31. Id.
32. Id. at 386-87; see Barnes, Commercial Speech Concerning Unlawful Conduct: A Clear
and Present Danger, 1984 B.Y.U. L. REv. 457, 466 (1984). Applying the content-based analysis, the
Court declared that the advertisements more closely resembled the purely commercial speech in
Chrestensen than the editorial expression in Sullivan. Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 385.
33. Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 388-89. Declaring that "we have no doubt that a newspaper
constitutionally could be forbidden to publish a want ad proposing a sale of narcotics or soliciting
prostitutes," the Court concluded:
Any First Amendment interest which might be served by advertising an ordinary commercial
proposal and which might arguably outweigh the governmental interest supporting the regula-
tion is altogether absent when the commercial activity itself [discrimination in employment]
is illegal and the restriction on advertising is incidental to a valid limitation on economic
activity.
Id. at 389.
At least one commentator has interpreted this language as an implicit acknowledgement by
the Court that pure commercial speech is not wholly undeserving of first amendment protection.
See Note, supra note 25, at 213. This interpretation suggests that restrictions on commercial ad-
vertising should be assessed by balancing the first amendment interest at stake against the govern-
mental interest. Id.
34. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). Then Associate Justice Rehnquist's dissent, joined by Justice White,
declined to adopt the content-based analysis:
This was a proposal to furnish services on a commercial basis, and since we have always
refused to distinguish for First Amendment purposes on the basis of content, it is no different
from an advertisement for a bucket shop operation or a Ponzi scheme which has its headquar-
ters in New York.
Id. at 831 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). As a purely commercial proposal, Justice Rehnquist deemed
it "entitled to little constitutional protection." Id. at 832. Justice Rehnquist also found the states
to have a legitimate public interest in regulation, citing New York's interest in maintaining high
standards in the medical profession and protecting the public from unscrupulous practices. Id.
Nevertheless, content-based criteria increasingly were accepted as evidenced by the Court's
decision a year later in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). In Young a
Detroit ordinance restricting the showing of sexually explicit but nonobscene movies was upheld,
in part on the ground that the content of the films rendered them deserving of a lesser degree of
constitutional protection. In an analogy to commercial speech, Justice Stevens commented that
"[tihe measure of constitutional protection to be afforded commercial speech will surely be gov-
erned largely by the content of the communication." Id. at 68-69; see Note, supra note 17, at 724
n.28.
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York City organization's advertisement for low cost abortions.35 The
statute made it a misdemeanor to encourage, by advertisement, the pro-
curement of abortions.3 6 In holding the statute an unconstitutional in-
fringement of first amendment speech, the Court reaffirmed its position
in Pittsburgh Press that speech does not lose its first amendment pro-
tection merely because it appears as a commercial advertisement.3 7
Confronted with Chrestensen's apparent holding to the contrary, the
Court stated that Chrestensen did not support the proposition that ad-
vertising is unprotected per se; rather, Chrestensen's holding was lim-
ited to regulation of the manner in which advertising could be
distributed.3 8 The Court noted that, unlike the speech in Chrestensen
and Pittsburgh Press, the advertisement at issue in Bigelow did more
than simply propose a commercial transaction; the speech communi-
cated information of widespread public and constitutional interest. 9
The value of commercial speech in the marketplace of ideas, in the
Court's view, mandated balancing the first amendment interest at stake
against the public interest purportedly advanced by the regulation. 0 In
extending first amendment protection to the advertisement, the Bige-
low balancing approach granted unprecedented protection to commer-
cial speech. Nonetheless, the Court retained some flexibility: the scale
still could tilt in favor of regulating an advertisement when the restric-
tion reasonably furthered a legitimate public interest.41 During its next
term, however, the Court would further expand constitutional protec-
tion of commercial speech.
35. 421 U.S. at 811 (majority opinion). Abortions were legal in New York, and no residency
requirements were imposed. Id. at 812.
36. Id. at 811. At the time Bigelow was arrested, the statute provided: "If any person, by
publication, lecture, advertisement, or by the sale or circulation of any publication, or in any other
manner, encourage or prompt the procuring of abortion or miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor." Id. at 812-13 (quoting VA CoDE ANN. § 18.1-63 (1960) (repealed 1975)).
37. Id. at 818.
38. Id. at 819-20. The Court noted that the continuing validity of Chrestensen was in ques-
tion. Id. at 820 n.6.
39. Id. at 822. The Court recognized that the advertisement in Bigelow's newspaper did more
than propose a commercial transaction: "the advertisement conveyed information of potential in-
terest and value to a diverse audience. . . [and] the activity advertised pertained to constitutional
interests." Id.; see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
40. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 826.
41. Id.; see Note, supra note 17, at 724.
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B. Toward Greater First Amendment Protection for Commercial
Speech
1. Virginia Board
The 1976 case of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. represents the culmination of the
Court's gradual reversal of its expressed stance in Chrestensen.4 2 In
Virginia Board the Court declared that purely commercial speech is en-
titled to first amendment protection because of its informational value
to individual consumers and the general public. 43 The focus of Virginia
Board was on the constitutionality of a Virginia statute effectively for-
bidding licensed pharmacists from advertising the prices of prescription
drugs." The complainants, prescription drug consumers, claimed that
the first amendment protected their right to receive price information
from pharmacists.45
The Court in Virginia Board had to determine whether the simple
communication, "I will sell you the X prescription drug at the Y
price, ' 46 without any editorial comment, was wholly outside the protec-
tion of the first amendment.47 The Court cited as indisputable the prin-
ciple that speech does not lose its first amendment protection whenever
the expression costs money or involves a solicitation to purchase.
48
Rather, content should be the distinguishing feature between unpro-
tected speech and speech that deserves first amendment protection.49
The Court concluded that purely commercial speech which does "no
more than propose a commercial transaction" 50 is not so far removed
from the "exposition of ideas"'" that it lacks first amendment protec-
42. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
43. Id. at 770.
44. Id. at 749-50. The constitutional attack focused on VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.35 (1974),
which provides:
Any pharmacist shall be considered guilty of unprofessional conduct who . . .(3) publishes,
advertises or promotes, directly or indirectly, in any manner whatsoever, any amount, price,
fee, premium, discount, rebate or credit terms for professional services or for drugs containing
narcotics or for any drugs which may be dispensed only by prescription.
Cited in Virginia Board, 425 U.S. at 750 n.2.
45. Virginia Board, 425 U.S. at 753-54. In addressing the issue of whether first amendment
protection applies to the flow of drug price information, the Court stated that first amendment
protection, when applicable, extends not only to the communication itself but to its source and
recipients as well. Id. at 756; see Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972) (stating that
freedom of speech "necessarily protects the right to receive").




50. Id. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413
U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
51. Id. (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
[Vol. 41:173
PROTECTION OF SPEECH
tion 2 The Court found particularly persuasive the argument that con-
sumers have at least as keen an interest in the free flow of commercial
information as in political debate. 53 In the Court's opinion, the prohibi-
tion of drug price information struck hardest at the poor, the sick, and
the elderly who were the least able to shop from pharmacist to pharma-
cist and who spent a disproportionate amount of their income on pre-
scription drugs.5 The Court concluded that because the free flow of
commercial information is indispensable to making economic decisions,
such advertising served the basic first amendment goal of enlightened
public decisionmaking in a democracy and thus was entitled to first
amendment protection.5
In reaching a decision, the Virginia Board majority rejected the
balancing test suggested by Bigelow. The alternative to Bigelow's
strongly paternalistic approach of regulating commercial speech was to
keep the channels of communication open so that individuals might
make an informed decision about what is in their best interests. 6 The
Court set forth the principle that the first amendment, not the legisla-
ture or the courts, balances the dangers of suppressing information and
the dangers of its misuse if unrestricted.57 The Court also stressed that
its conclusion was limited to whether a state may suppress the dissemi-
nation of concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity
because of a fear of the information's effect upon its recipients. 8 In
essence, the Court adopted a per se approach with respect to content-
52. Id. The Court also criticized the legislative approach as "highly paternalistic." Id. at 770.
53. Id. at 763.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 765. The Court reasoned:
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dissemi-
nation of information as to who is producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at
what price. So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of
our resources in large measure will be made through numerous private economic decisions. It
is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well
informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable. And if it is
indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system, it is also indis-
pensable to the formation of intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated
or altered. Therefore, even if the First Amendment were thought to be primarily an instru-
ment to enlighten public decisionmaking in a democracy, we could not say that the free flow
of information does not serve that goal.
Id. (footnotes and citations omitted); see A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948) (analyzing the role of the first amendment in guaranteeing democratic self-
government).
56. "Virginia is free to require whatever professional standards it wishes of its pharmacies
.... But it may not do so by keeping the public in ignorance of the entirely lawful terms that
competing pharmacists are offering." Virginia Board, 425 U.S. at 770.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 773.
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based restrictions on commercial speech,59 but cautioned that its hold-
ing did not apply to mere time, place, and manner restrictions."0 These
content-neutral restrictions are justified if they serve a significant gov-
ernmental interest and leave open ample alternative avenues of
communication."'
Justice Rehnquist, the sole dissenter, criticized the majority's ex-
tension of first amendment protection to commercial speech, warning
that the Court's opinion opened the door for active promotion of pre-
scription drugs, liquor, cigarettes, and other products whose use argua-
bly should be discouraged. 2 Justice Rehnquist also took issue with the
Court's assertion that its holding was consistent with the view that the
first amendment is primarily a vehicle for the promotion of enlightened
public decisionmaking about political, social, and other issues impor-
tant to a democratic society. 3 Economic choices, in Justice Rehnquist's
view, do not rise to the level of significance warranting constitutional
protection. Finally, the dissent declared that the potential harm
caused by some products justifies statutory limitations on the dissemi-
nation of information about the products even though they may not be
sufficiently harmful to warrant an outright prohibition against their
sale.6 5 Justice Rehnquist stated that the legitimacy of such legislation
should be determined by balancing individual interests in free speech
59. Note, supra note 17, at 726.
60. Virginia Board, 425 U.S. at 771.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 781 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 787.
64. Id. (explaining that "[i]t is undoubtedly arguable that many people in the country regard
the choice of shampoo as just as important as who may be elected to local, state, or national
political office, but that does not automatically bring information about competing shampoos
within the protection of the First Amendment"); see Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Eco-
nomic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REv. 1 (1979). Professors Jackson and
Jeffries argue that Virginia Board was wrongly decided because first amendment protection should
be extended only to speech concerning certain identifiable values such as effective self-government
and individual self-fulfillment through free expression. Id. at 5. Despite this argument, the Court
in Virginia Board elevated ordinary business advertising, which implicates none of these funda-
mental values, to the realm of constitutionally protected speech. Id. at 5-6.
According to Jackson and Jeffries, achieving aggregate economic efficiency and maximizing
opportunity in a free market are values worthy of legislative consideration, but are not proper
subjects of constitutional protection under the first amendment. Id. at 6. Their thesis, therefore, is
that the first amendment should not protect commercial speech. Id. at 9. Jackson and Jeffries saw
in Virginia Board the renovation of the discredited doctrine of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905), which embodied the heyday of the Court's invalidation of legislation solely because it inter-
fered with economic liberty. Jackson & Jeffries, supra, at 30-31. "[E]conomic due process is resur-
rected, clothed in the ill-fitting garb of the first amendment, and sent forth to battle the kind of
special interest legislation that the Court has tolerated for more than forty years." Id. at 30 (foot-
note omitted).
65. Virginia Board, 425 U.S. at 789 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist placed
prohibitions on television commercials advertising liquor and cigarettes in this category. Id.
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against determinations about the public welfare.6 6 In his view, the dan-
ger that advertising would encourage widespread use of prescription
drugs, either by illicit use or by generating patient pressure on doctors
to prescribe such drugs outweighed individual interests in the freedom
of advertising.
6 7
2. Virginia Board's Progeny
Subsequent decisions followed the holding in Virginia Board and
granted almost complete first amendment protection to commercial
speech." In Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro,69 for
example, the Supreme Court struck down as violative of the first
amendment a township ordinance, prohibiting the posting of "For Sale"
and "Sold" signs, enacted to stem the flight of white homeowners from
a racially integrated community.70 The Court rejected the characteriza-
tion of the ordinance as a simple time, place, and manner restriction."
First, the ordinance did not leave open satisfactory alternative avenues
of communication.7 2 Second, the ordinance was not enacted to promote
aesthetic values or other values "unrelated to the suppression of free
expression. ''7 The township, by not prohibiting all lawn signs or all
signs of a particular dimension, manifested a complete lack of concern
for the place and manner of the speech's dissemination. Moreover, the
proscription of certain signs based on their content was motivated by a
fear of the signs' primary effect-that recipients would act on the infor-
66. Id. at 789. This balancing test was consistent with the Bigelow approach abandoned by
the majority.
67. Id. Justice Rehnquist envisioned a scenario in which advertisements such as the following
might become commonplace:
"Pain getting you down? Insist that your physician prescribe Demerol. You pay a little more
than for aspirin, but you get a lot more relief."
"Can't shake the flu? Get a prescription for Tetracycline from your doctor today."
"Don't spend another sleepless night. Ask your doctor to prescribe Seconal without delay."
Id. at 788.
68. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678 (1977); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); see also
Note, supra note 17, at 726-27.
69. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
70. Id. at 86-88, 97.
71. Id. at 93-94.
72. Id. at 93. The options available to sellers-newspaper advertising and listing with real
estate agents-involved greater costs and less autonomy, were less likely to reach buyers, and
might be less effective in conveying the message. Id. at 93; see supra text accompanying notes 60-
61.
73. Linmark Assocs., 431 U.S. at 93-94 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968) (footnote omitted)). Nor did the ordinance restrict a type of communication such as televi-
sion that "intrudes on the privacy of the home, . . . makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer
or auditor to avoid exposure." Id. at 94 (quoting Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205,
209 (1975)).
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mation available-rather than a detrimental secondary effect.7
Despite the township's laudable goal of promoting stable, racially
integrated neighborhoods, the Court declared that the first amendment
prohibits a state from achieving its aim by restricting the free flow of
truthful information. 5 The Court warned that to allow the regulation of
the information at issue would mean that every locality in the country
could suppress any facts that reflect poorly on the locality as long as the
community makes a plausible claim that disclosure would cause the re-
cipients of the information to act "irrationally."7
In Carey v. Population Services International" the Court held un-
constitutional the total suppression of advertisements for contracep-
tives.7" The prohibition, which sought to prevent the dissemination of
any information about the availability and price of contraceptives,
could not be justified as a mere time, place, and manner restriction; nor
could it stand as a prohibition against misleading advertisements or ad-
vertisements proposing an illegal transaction. 9 The statute not only
contravened the societal interest in the free flow of commercial infor-
mation about entirely legal products, but also suppressed speech con-
cerning the availability of constitutionally protected products.80
Consequently, the Court found the regulation unjustified. 1
Finally, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona8 2 the Court struck down
an Arizona disciplinary rule against advertising the availability and
price of routine legal services. 83 Relying on Virginia Board, the Court
held that the regulation violated the first amendment.84 The Court lim-
ited its holding to the blanket suppression of truthful advertisements
regarding the availability of a lawful service and acknowledged certain
permissible limitations including reasonable time, place, and manner
regulations,85 prohibitions against advertisements concerning illegal
transactions," and suppression of advertising on the electronic broad-
cast media that poses problems "warranting special consideration."87
74. Id. at 93-94 (citing Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 71 n.34 (1976)).
75. Id. at 95-96 (referring to Virginia Board, 425 U.S. 748).
76. Id. at 96.
77. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
78. Id. at 700-02.
79. Id. at 700 (citing Virginia Board, 425 U.S. at 771-73).
80. Id. at 701.
81. Id. at 701-02.
82. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
83. Id. at 383-84.
84. Id. at 363-65.
85. Id. at 384 (citing Virginia Board, 425 U.S. at 771).
86. Id. (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
388 (1973)).
87. Id. (citing Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), afl'd,
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Justice Rehnquist dissented from the portion of the Bates opinion
that holds the Arizona regulation of commercial solicitation by lawyers
to be an infringement on the first amendment.8 8 The dissent declared
that invocation of the first amendment to protect advertisements of
goods and services undermines the value of the first amendment as a
protector of freedom of expression on matters of public importance.89
Moreover, Justice Rehnquist lamented that the constitutionally sound
and predictable distinction established by Valentine v. Chrestensen90
in excepting commercial speech from first amendment protection had
degenerated into case-by-case adjudication of first amendment claims
brought by advertisers. 1
C. The Waning of First Amendment Protection for Commercial
Speech
Virginia Board and its progeny represent the peak of constitutional
protection for commercial speech. Later cases have refined the commer-
cial speech doctrine and concomitantly narrowed first amendment pro-
tection of commercial expression. In two 1978 cases concerning state
regulation of attorney solicitation, for example, the Court distinguished
speech linked to political expression from speech proposing a commer-
cial transaction.2 Both cases stemmed from disciplinary actions against
attorneys for soliciting clients, but involved markedly different factual
settings. In In re Primus,93 Edna Primus' offense was to advise a Medi-
caid patient, who had been sterilized as a condition of continued receipt
of government benefits, that the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) would represent her without fee in a suit against the doctor
who had performed the operation.9 4 In granting full first amendment
protection to Primus' speech, the Court stated that Primus' actions
were an expression of her political beliefs and ideas that reflected her
affiliation with the ACLU. 5 The case thus involved the rights to politi-
cal expression and associational freedom, both of which have been tra-
ditionally protected by the first amendment.9 6
405 U.S. 1000 (1972) (upholding the constitutionality of 15 U.S.C. § 1335, which prohibits broad-
cast advertising of cigarettes)).
88. Id. at 404 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part).
89. Id.
90. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). For a discussion of Chrestensen, see supra notes 18-21.
91. Bates, 433 U.S. at 404-05 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part).
92. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 59 (Supp. 1979).
93. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
94. Id. at 414-16.
95. Id. at 426-32, 437-38 & n.32.
96. Id. The Court noted that "[w]here political expression or association is at issue, the
Court has not tolerated the degree of imprecision that often characterizes government regulation
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In contrast, Albert Ohralik, the attorney disciplined in Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Association,7 offered his services on a contingency fee
basis to two eighteen-year-old accident victims not long after the acci-
dent occurred.98 While Primus had sought to vindicate the legal rights
of others in the tradition of lawyers volunteering their services in the
public interest, Ohralik's actions were primarily for the benefit of his
own pecuniary interests."' The Court also distinguished the public ad-
vertisement in Bates from Ohralik's in-person solicitation by pointing
out that Ohralik's actions, by exerting pressure for an immediate re-
sponse, left little time for comparison and reflection."' Consequently,
the Court deemed the in-person solicitation of remunerative employ-
ment to be entitled to marginal first amendment protection subject to
regulation in furtherance of important state interests.' Given Ohio's
compelling interest in preventing the potential overreaching inherent in
solicitation, the prophylactic rule restricting a lawyer's in-person solici-
tation of employment was justified. 02 By recognizing a state's interest
in regulating solicitation of a lawful service, this decision signaled a re-
treat from the broad first amendment protection conferred upon com-
mercial speech in Virginia Board.
Ohralik paved the way for Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission'03 in which the Court clarified the degree of
constitutional protection that commercial speech merits. Central Hud-
son opposed, on first amendment grounds, an order by the New York
Public Service Commission banning all promotional advertising in-
tended to stimulate the purchase of utility services while allowing infor-
of the conduct of commercial affairs." Id. at 434.
97. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
98. Id. at 450-51.
99. Compare Primus, 436 U.S. at 438 n.32 with Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 471 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
100. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457.
101. Id. at 459.
102. Id. at 462, 468. Ohralik was disciplined under Disciplinary Rules (DR) 2-103(A) and
2-104(A) of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 453.
DR 2-103(A) of the Ohio Code provides: "A lawyer shall not recommend employment as a
private practitioner, of himself, his partner, or associate to a non-lawyer who has not sought his
advice regarding employment of a lawyer." OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR 2-103(A) (1970), quoted in Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 453 n.9.
Ohio DR 2-104(A)(1) provides:
(A) A lawyer who has given unsolicited advice to a layman that he should obtain counsel or
take legal action shall not accept employment resulting from that advice, except that:
(1) A lawyer may accept employment by a close friend, relative, former client (if the
advice is germane to the former employment), or one whom the lawyer reasonably
believes to be a client.
OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 2-104(A)(1) (1970), quoted in Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 453
n.9.
103. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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mational advertising designed to shift consumption.1 04 The Court
decided whether a state's interest in decreasing public demand for a
lawful activity justifies suppressing advertisement of the activity's
availability.10 5 The Court noted that while direct comments on public
issues retain the full panoply of first amendment protections, state-
ments made in the context of commercial transactions are entitled to
less constitutional protection. 06 Moreover, the protection available for
commercial speech depends on the nature of the message and the gov-
ernmental interest advanced by its prohibition.1
0 7
The Court developed a four-pronged test to balance the competing
interests of government and advertisers. First, the speech at issue must
concern a lawful activity and not be misleading. Second, the restriction
on commercial speech must serve a substantial governmental interest.
Third, the regulation must directly further the asserted interest. Fi-
nally, the regulation must be no more extensive than necessary to
achieve the state's interest.10 8 Applying this test, the Court found Cen-
tral Hudson's advertisement accurate and related to a lawful activity;
therefore, the advertisement deserved first amendment protection. 0 9
The Court also determined that New York had a substantial interest in
energy conservation and in ensuring that rates were equitable and effi-
cient.1 0 Even though the connection between promotional advertising
and rate structures was tenuous, the Commission's order directly ad-
vanced the State's interest in energy conservation."' The order, how-
ever, failed the fourth prong of the test because New York made no
showing that a more limited regulation would be ineffective in achieving
the State's objective." 2 Consequently, the Court held that the prohibi-
104. Id. at 558-60. This case arose in the context of the energy shortage of the early 1970s.
The order was the Commission's response to concerns that the State did not have sufficient fuel to
meet consumer demands for the 1973-74 winter. Though the fuel situation, and consequently the
justification for the order, became less critical over the next few years, the ban on advertising
remained. Id. at 559.
105. See Note, supra note 17, at 727-28 (discussing Ohralik and Friedman v. Rogers, 440
U.S. 1 (1979), as suggesting a retreat from the Virginia Board and Linmark Associates rejections
of "paternalism" and as implying that a state may protect its citizens by shielding them from
information).
106. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 n.5 (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980)).
107. Id. at 563.
108. Id. at 566.
109. Id. at 566-68.
110. Id. at 569.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 570-71. The Court gave considerable attention to Central Hudson's argument that
the ban not only prohibited advertising that would encourage energy use, but also prevented the
utility from promoting electric services that would decrease energy use by diverting demand from
inefficient sources. Id. at 570.
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tion violated the first amendment because the prohibition was not the
least restrictive means of serving the State's interest.
113
Justice Blackmun, concurring in the judgment, denounced the ma-
jority's test as inconsistent with prior cases that provided full first
amendment protection for truthful, nondeceptive commercial speech.
114
Justice Blackmun agreed that the intermediate scrutiny employed by
the court was applicable to misleading or coercive speech and to time,
place, and manner restrictions. He advocated stricter scrutiny when, as
in this case, the state suppresses information about a lawful product in
order to manipulate private decisions about the product's use." 5 Justice
Blackmun questioned the legitimacy of state suppression of information
on the availability of a legally offered product to decrease the demand
for its use. He argued that, absent clear and present danger, a state
should not be able to prohibit speech simply because of the effect the
message may have on the public. 1 Moreover, in Justice Blackmun's
view, content-based regulatory measures represent an attempt by the
state to manipulate the choices of its citizens by depriving the public of
the information needed to make a free choice. 17
Justice Blackmun stated further that Central Hudson did not in-
volve the special problems of the electronic broadcast media or concern
the advertising of an unlawful transaction.118 Given that the issue was
state suppression of information about a legal activity because of fear
concerning that information's effect on the recipients, Justice Black-
mun found the majority's inquiry into the substantiality of the State's
interest inappropriate and inconsistent with the Virginia Board holding
that a state may not seek to further its aims by keeping its citizens in
113. Id. at 572.
114. Id. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
115. Id. at 573, 576-78. Justice Blackmun cited a number of prior Supreme Court decisions
invalidating restraints designed to deprive consumers of information about legally offered goods
and services. Id. at 574; see Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (legal services); Carey
v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 700-02 (1977) (contraceptives); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v.
TownshiP of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (homes for sale); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (pharmaceutical prices); Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (abortions); see also The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 168 (1980) (arguing that the Court's four-part analysis inadequately protects commercial
speech; in order to further the core values of the first amendment, content-based regulation of
commercial speech should be subject to full first amendment protection).
At the other end of the spectrum, Justice Rehnquist's dissent criticized the majority's decision
for allowing too much deference to commercial speech and termed the Court's actions a return to
the Lochner era when the Court struck down state economic regulations. Central Hudson, 447 U.S.
at 589 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist further condemned the Court for unlocking a
Pandora's Box by giving commercial speech co-equal status with political speech. Id.
116. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 575 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 574-75.
118. Id. at 576.
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ignorance.119 Justice Blackmun ended his concurrence by voicing con-
cern about the far-reaching ramifications of allowing a state to prohibit
information about a lawful product in order to decrease public demand
for it. Rather than suppressing groups from advertising their products
and services in order to deter the public from using them, he advocated
an approach whereby the state would directly regulate the use of the
product or service.
120
The Supreme Court has applied the Central Hudson analysis in-
consistently in subsequent cases.1 21 In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San
Diego, 2 for example, the Court, while claiming to apply the intermedi-
ate standard of review mandated by Central Hudson, actually em-
ployed a more deferential test.123 At issue was the constitutionality of a
city ordinance restricting commercial and noncommercial billboard ad-
vertising in order to improve traffic safety and aesthetics. 5 The Me-
tromedia plurality applied a diluted version of the Central Hudson test
to the commercial component of the ordinance and found that the city's
assessment of the risks the signs posed was "not manifestly unreasona-
ble.' 2 ' First, the advertising at issue concerned a lawful activity and
was not misleading. Second, the twin goals of traffic safety and city ap-
pearance were substantial governmental interests. Third, because bill-
boards have a distracting effect which contributes to traffic accidents
and poses an aesthetic harm, the ordinance directly advanced the as-
serted governmental interest. With respect to the fourth prong, how-
ever, the Court ignored the least restrictive means question and
deferred to the city's judgment.1 2 7 The Court summarily rejected the
119. Id. (citing Virginia Board, 425 U.S. at 770).
120. Id. at 579.
121. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (holding that a prohi-
bition on the mailing of unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives violated the first amend-
ment's protection of commercial speech); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (holding that
restrictions on attorney advertisements violate the first amendment); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of
San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (holding that a city ordinance restricting the erection of outdoor
advertising displays, insofar as it affected commercial speech, met the constitutional requirements
of Central Hudson).
122. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
123. Id. at 34-35 n.12 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Note, supra note 7, at 782-83; Com-
ment, supra note 7, at 910-11.
124. Under the ordinance, the occupant of the property could advertise his own goods and
services, but could not advertise others' goods and services. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 503 (plurality
opinion).
125. Id. at 493.
126. Id. at 509. Some commentators have compared the Metromedia standard of review to
the "rational basis" test used in substantive due process analysis of economic regulations. See
Comment, supra note 7, at 910; Note, supra note 7, at 783 (stating that the Metromedia analysis
"reduced Central Hudson's commercial speech test to a rational basis standard of review").
127. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 507-10.
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claim that the ordinance was broader than necessary by saying, "If the
city has a sufficient basis for believing that billboards are traffic hazards
and are unattractive, then obviously the most direct and perhaps the
only effective approach to solving the problems they create is to pro-
hibit them."'""
Although the ordinance purportedly satisfied the four Central
Hudson criteria insofar as it regulated commercial speech, the Court
subjected the noncommercial component to stricter scrutiny because
case precedent indicated noncommercial speech is entitled to "a greater
degree of protection than commercial speech.' 129 The Court held the
ordinance unconstitutional because the public interest in restricting on-
site advertising did not sufficiently outweigh the private interest in non-
commercial communication. 30
Metromedia and Central Hudson may be reconciled by focusing on
whether the regulation of commercial expression is content-based or
content-neutral.' 3 ' The Court employed deferential review in Me-
tromedia in which the regulation of commercial speech was content-
neutral. On the other hand, the Court applied an intermediate level of
scrutiny in Central Hudson where the regulation of commercial speech
was content-based. 3 2 This bifurcation is consistent with the two levels
of review for noncommercial speech-a strict standard for content-
based restrictions and a more relaxed one for content-neutral regula-
tions.'33 Moreover, "[b]ecause commercial speech requires less protec-
tion than noncommercial speech, the two levels of review for regulations
of commercial expression should be more lenient than the standards
applied in reviewing analogous regulations of non-commercial
speech.'
3 4
128. Id. at 508.
129. Id. at 513. "Because our cases have consistently distinguished between the constitu-
tional protection afforded commercial as opposed to noncommercial speech, in evaluating appel-
lants' contention we consider separately the effect of the ordinance on commercial and
noncommercial speech." Id. at 504-05.
130. Id. at 521.
131. See Comment, supra note 7, at 917.
132. Id. at 916-17; see also Note, supra note 7, at 783 (stating that "it is significant that the
San Diego ban was directed only at the form of the advertising, not its content" and that "Me-
tromedia did not necessarily alter Central Hudson's intermediate standard of review for content
based regulations designed to suppress information about a particular product").
133. See Comment, supra note 7, at 916.
134. Id. at 914 (footnote omitted).
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III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel
In 1985 the Supreme Court addressed the regulation of commercial
speech by attorneys in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel."5
The Court focused on whether a state may discipline an attorney for
running nondeceptive newspaper advertisements to solicit business, and
whether a state may seek to prevent the public from being deceived by
requiring attorneys to disclose fee arrangements in their advertise-
ments."' Zauderer, an attorney practicing in Ohio, had run two adver-
tisements in Ohio newspapers. The first advertisement informed
readers that his firm would represent defendants charged with drunk
driving and would refund the legal fees if the client were convicted of
drunk driving. 137 The second advertisement, featuring a drawing of the
Dalkon Shield accompanied by the caption "Did you use this IUD?",
advised the public of Zauderer's willingness to represent women injured
by their use of the Dalkon Shield Intrauterine Device.138 The Office of
Disciplinary Counsel subsequently filed a complaint charging the appel-
lant with numerous disciplinary violations stemming from the publica-
tion of the two advertisements.13 9 Zauderer's principal defense was that
135. 471 U.S. 626, 629 (1985).
136. Id. at 629.
137. Id.
138. Id. (capitalizations omitted). The advertisement also contained the following
information:
"The Dalkon Shield Interuterine [sic] Device is alleged to have caused serious pelvic infec-
tions resulting in hospitalizations, tubal damage, infertility, and hysterectomies. It is also al-
leged to have caused unplanned pregnancies ending in abortions, miscarriages, septic
abortions, tubal or ectopic pregnancies, and full-term deliveries. If you or a friend have had a
similar experience do not assume it is too late to take legal action against the Shield's manu-
facturer. Our law firm is presently representing women on such cases. The cases are handled
on a contingent fee basis of the amount recovered. If there is no recovery, no legal fees are
owed by our clients."
Id. at 631.
139. Id. at 632-33. The complaint alleged that in offering representation on a contingent-fee
basis in a criminal case, the appellant had violated Ohio Disciplinary Rule 2-101(A), which pro-
vides that "[a] lawyer shall not .. .use, or participate in the use of, any form of public communi-
cation containing a false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self-laudatory or unfair statement or
claim." OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrrY DR 2-101(A) (1970), quoted in Zauderer, 471
U.S. at 631 n.3. Concerning the Dalkon Shield advertisement, the complaint alleged that by run-
ning the advertisement and accepting employment from respondents, the appellant had violated a
number of other disciplinary rules. First, the appellant violated Ohio DR 2-101(B), which prohibits
the use of illustrations in advertisements for attorney services. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 632 (citing
OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B) (1970)). Second, appellant violated Ohio
DR 2-103(A), which prohibits an attorney from recommending himself for employment "to a non-
lawyer who has not sought his advice regarding employment of a lawyer." Id. at 633 (quoting OHIO
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(A) (1970); see also supra note 102 (reprinting
text of DR 2-103(A)). Third, appellant violated DR 2-104(A) by accepting employment as a result
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the rules governing the content of attorney advertising failed to with-
stand first amendment scrutiny and were, therefore, unconstitutional."10
Because Zauderer's advertisements "undeniably propose[d] a com-
mercial transaction," the Court deemed the advertisements to fall
within the bounds of commercial speech.'" As commercial speech, the
advertisements were entitled only to limited first amendment protec-
tion.142 Applying the test enunciated in Central Hudson,143 the Court
concluded that blanket prohibitions on price advertising by attorneys
and bans against the use of nondeceptive terminology in attorney ad-
vertisements were impermissible. 44 The Court found unconvincing
Ohio's contention that a broad prophylactic rule against attorney adver-
tising was essential to carry out the substantial government interest in
ensuring that citizens were not encouraged to institute litigation based
on inaccurate and ambiguous statements. 45 The Court understood the
State's argument to proceed from the premise that differentiating false,
deceptive advertisements from truthful, beneficial advertisements is in-
herently difficult. To the contrary, the Court determined that assessing
the validity of the information and legal advice in the advertisements
was not necessarily complex."46 Moreover, the Court found the accuracy
of Zauderer's statements regarding the Dalkon Shield litigation to be
of giving unsolicited advice to a layman. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 633; see also supra note 102 (re-
printing text of DR 2-104(A)). Finally, the appellant's failure to disclose the client's potential lia-
bility for costs as opposed to legal fees in an unsuccessful suit violated DR 2-101(A) because the
advertisement was "misleading" and also violated DR 2-101(B)(15), which requires that advertise-
ments mentioning contingent-fee rates "disclos[e] whether percentages are computed before or af-
ter deduction of court costs and expenses." Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 632 n.4.
140. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 634. In support of his claim, the appellant relied on Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), and In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982). Zauderer, 471 U.S. at
634.
141. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 637. In identifying the advertisements as commercial speech, the
Court noted that statements in the advertisements regarding the legal rights of women injured by
the Dalkon Shield did not transform the advertisements into noncommercial speech deserving the
full panoply of first amendment protections. Id. at n.7.
142. Id. at 637.
143. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
144. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 638. The Zauderer Court distinguished its decision in Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Association, 436 U.S. 447 (1978), by stating that the unique regulatory difficulties
presented by in-person solicitation justified the adoption in Ohralik of a prophylactic rule banning
lawyers from soliciting for monetary gain. "[I]n-person solicitation of professional employment by
a lawyer does not stand on a par with truthful advertising about the availability and terms of
routine legal services." 471 U.S. at 641-42 (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455). Because the printed
advertisements at issue in Zauderer were "more conducive to reflection and the exercise of choice
on the part of the consumer" than face-to-face solicitation by an attorney, the Court found lacking
the substantial government interests that had justified the restriction imposed in Ohralik. Id. at
642.
145. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 644.
146. Id. at 645-46.
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easily verifiable. 147 Based on these findings, the Court concluded that
an attorney may not be disciplined for the solicitation of legal business
through printed advertising that contains truthful, nondeceptive infor-
mation and advice about the legal rights of potential clients.'48 The
Court went on to state that the mere possibility that some members of
the public might find the advertising embarrassing or offensive could
not justify the information's suppression.4 9
The Court next addressed whether a state may affirmatively re-
quire disclosure in commercial advertising. The Court recognized that
in some situations a compulsion to speak may be equally as violative of
the first amendment as a prohibition against speech. However,
Zauderer's interest in not disclosing particular factual information
about fee arrangements in his advertisements was minimal because the
benefit that such commercial speech provides to consumers is the pri-
mary justification for the extension of first amendment protection to
commercial speech.' The Court held, therefore, that an advertiser's
rights receive adequate protection as long as disclosure requirements
are reasonably related to a state's interest in preventing the deception
of consumers.' 5' Applying this reasoning, the Court found that the
State's argument that it is deceptive to use advertising referring to con-
tingent fee arrangements without mentioning the client's liability for
legal costs was sufficiently reasonable to support a requirement that the
advertising disclose the client's liability for costs. 152
B. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of
California
At issue in the 1986 case of Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public
Utilities Commission of California53 was whether a state public utili-
ties commission may compel a privately owned utility to include in its
billing envelopes speech of another party with which the utility dis-
agrees.15' Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG & E) had distributed for
147. Id. at 645.
148. Id. at 647.
149. Id. at 648 (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977)).
150. Id. at 651 (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976)).
151. Id. The Court noted that because the first amendment interests raised by disclosure
requirements were weaker than those at issue when speech was prohibited, a less stringent stan-
dard of review was appropriate. Consequently, the Court rejected the appellant's contention that
the disclosure requirements be analyzed under the "least restrictive means" analysis and struck
down if there were any other means to serve the State's purposes. Id. at n.14.
152. Id. at 653.
153. 106 S. Ct. 903 (1986).
154. Id. at 905.
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over sixty years in its monthly billing statement a newsletter that in-
cluded political editorials, tips on energy conservation, and other mat-
ters of public interest.'55 California's Public Utilities Commission had
determined that the "extra space" in the billing envelope, after inser-
tion of the monthly bill and any necessary legal notices, was the prop-
erty of the ratepayers. 56 Proceeding from the assumption that
ratepayers would benefit from exposure to a variety of opinions, the
Commission permitted a third party to use the space to publicize views
contrary to the views held by PG & E.157 In response to PG & E's claim
of first amendment protection from being forced to disseminate
messages with which it disagreed, the Supreme Court considered
whether requiring a private corporation to provide a forum for opposing
views infringes on the corporation's freedom of speech.15 The Court
found that, notwithstanding the Commission's definition of the relevant
property rights to the extra space, "compelled access" penalizes and de-
ters the expression of ideas and forces speakers to tailor their speech to
the opponent's agenda. 5 ' The Court stated that regardless of who
owned the extra space, the Commission's order forced PG & E to use its
own property-the envelopes-to distribute the opponent's message.1
6 0
Given these burdens on PG & E's protected speech, the Court pos-
tulated that the Commission's order would be upheld only if narrowly
tailored to serve a "compelling state interest. ' 161 The Court addressed
155. Id.
156. Id. at 906.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 908. Justice Powell, delivering the plurality opinion in which Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Brennan and O'Connor joined, recognized that concomitant with the first amendment
freedom from restraints on voluntary speech is a freedom not to speak publicly that serves the
same goal as freedom of affirmative speech. Id. at 909. Justice Rehnquist took the opposite view,
stating that the "negative free speech rights, applicable to individuals and perhaps the print me-
dia, should [not] be extended to corporations generally." Id. at 917 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist also adopted the position that case precedent could not be reconciled with the
notion that "the First Amendment prohibits governmental action that only indirectly and re-
motely affects a speaker's contribution to the overall mix of information available to society." Id.
(emphasis in original). Justice Rehnquist conceded, however, that the first amendment "does pro-
hibit governmental action affecting the mix of information available to the public if the effect of
the action approximates that of direct content-based suppression of speech." Id. at 918.
159. Id. at 908 (plurality opinion). Compelled access consists of forcing a private corporation
"to provide a forum for views other than its own [that] may infringe on the corporation's freedom
of speech." Id.
160. Id. at 912.
161. Id. at 913 (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535
(1980), and First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978)). The Court rejected
the Commission's alternative argument that the order was an acceptable time, place, or manner
restriction that served a "significant governmental interest" and left open "ample alternative chan-
nels for communication." Id. at 914. The Court stated that a valid time, place, or manner restric-
tion must be content-neutral. Id.
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in turn each of the two assertedly compelling state interests furthered
by the access order. First, the Court stated that while the State's inter-
est in fair and effective ratemaking may be compelling, that interest
could be advanced through other means, such as fees and awards, that
would not abridge first amendment rights.162 On the facts presented,
the Court found no significant relationship between the access rule and
the asserted state interest.163 Second, the Court noted that the content-
based regulation at issue would not further the asserted state interest in
promoting speech by disseminating diverse views. 1 4 The restriction was
not a narrowly tailored means of serving the state interest. Finally, the
Court declared that the "State cannot advance some points of view by
burdening the expression of others.'
1 65
C. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.
On the same day it struck down the Pacific Gas restriction as viola-
tive of the first amendment, the Supreme Court in City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc.16 6 upheld on first amendment grounds the va-
lidity of a zoning ordinance prohibiting adult motion picture theaters
from locating within 1000 feet of any residential zone, single or multiple
family dwelling, church, park, or school. 67 Justice Rehnquist, delivering
the opinion of the Court, analyzed the ordinance as a time, place, and
manner regulation because the ordinance merely restricted the location
of adult theaters, but did not ban them entirely. 68 As a content-neutral
regulation, the ordinance was constitutional as long as it was designed
to serve a substantial governmental interest and did not unreasonably
162. Id. at 913.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 914. Because the order awarded access on the basis of disagreement with the
utility's views, the Court characterized the order as content-based. Id. at 910-11. Justice Rehnquist
disagreed with the plurality's characterization of the regulation, instead viewing the order as con-
tent-neutral: "[Tihe central reason for the access order-to provide for an effective ratepayer
voice-would not vary in importance if PG & E had never distributed the inserts or ceased distrib-
uting them tomorrow." Id. at 919 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 914 (plurality opinion). Justice Rehnquist disagreed with the proposition that the
access order abridged first amendment values. He viewed first amendment protection of corporate
speech as arising not from the interest in self-expression as for individuals, but from the purpose
of "fostering a broad forum of information to facilitate self-government." Id. at 921 (Rehnquist.,
J., dissenting) (citing First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)). Justice Rehnquist
noted that the same "societal interest in receiving information and ideas" that supported editorial
speech also served as the basis for the protection of the corporate speech at issue. Because PG & E
was trying to suppress the presentation of opposing views, Justice Rehnquist characterized its con-
stitutional interest as de minimus. Id. (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S.
626, 651 (1985)).
166. 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986).
167. Id. at 926-27.
168. Id. at 928.
1988]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:173
limit alternative channels of communication. 16 9 Thus, the Court distin-
guished content-neutral restrictions, such as the zoning ordinance at is-
sue, from content-based regulations, which presumptively violate the
first amendment.17 0 The Court justified its characterization of the ordi-
nance as content-neutral by emphasizing that the ordinance was aimed
"not at the content of the films shown at 'adult motion picture thea-
tres,' but rather at the secondary effects of such theaters on the sur-
rounding community.' 7' The Court cited crime prevention,
maintenance of property values, protection of retail trade, and preser-
vation of the quality of urban life among the values that the city sought
to advance by enacting the ordinance. 72 Furthermore, because the ordi-
nance was deemed content-neutral rather than content-based, the ordi-
nance did not violate the principle that a state may not grant the use of
a forum to persons whose views the state finds acceptable but deny use
to persons wishing to express less favored or more controversial
views. '
7
After determining that the appropriate inquiry for content-neutral
restrictions focuses on whether the regulation serves "a substantial gov-
ernment interest" and allows for "reasonable alternative avenues of
communication,' 1 74 the Court proceeded to analyze the local ordinance.
The Court found first that the ordinance served the city's interest in
preserving the quality of life'75 and that no constitutional infirmity
169. Id. The dissent, viewing the ordinance as a content-based restriction, applied a higher
standard of review than the majority. "[T]he ordinance, like any other content-based restriction on
speech, is constitutional 'only if the [city] can show that [it] is a precisely drawn means of serving
a compelling [governmental] interest.'" Id. at 937 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980)). The dissent further stated that
"[o]nly this strict approach can insure that cities will not use their zoning powers as a pretext for
suppressing constitutionally protected expression." Id. The dissent criticized the majority for being
too deferential to the city. Id.
170. Id. at 928 (majority opinion).
171. Id. at 929 (emphasis in original). Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented,
characterizing the ordinance as a content-based restriction on certain kinds of speech. That the
deleterious secondary effects of adult theaters arguably constituted a compelling justification for
the ordinance did not transform the regulation into a content-neutral ordinance. Id. at 934 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). The dissent theorized that the purpose of the regulation in reality was to
discriminate against adult theaters on the basis of the content of the films they exhibit. Id. In
support of its contention, the dissent pointed out that after the lawsuit the city council amended
the regulation by providing that the policy underlying the ordinance was the protection and pres-
ervation of "the quality of urban life through effective land use planning." Id. at 935.
172. Id. at 929 (majority opinion).
173. Id. (citing Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972)).
174. Id. at 930.
175. Id. In finding that the ordinance furthered a substantial governmental interest, the
Court held that the city was entitled to rely on the experiences and studies of nearby cities in
enacting adult theater zoning ordinances. Id. at 930-31. The first amendment did not require that
the city conduct new studies as long as the outside evidence was "reasonably believed to be rele-
vant to the problem that the city addresses." Id. at 931.
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tainted the means adopted by Renton to advance its substantial state
interest. 176 The ordinance was "narrowly tailored" to affect only those
theaters shown to produce the undesired secondary effects.1 " Second,
the Court found that the zoning regulation left open ample alternative
avenues of communication. 17 The ordinance provided 520 acres, ap-
proximately five percent of the land in Renton, for use as adult theater
sites.179 Therefore, the Court rejected the first amendment challenge to
the ordinance because the ordinance was a valid governmental response
to the serious problems posed by adult theaters. 180
D. Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co.
of Puerto Rico
In July of 1986 the Supreme Court in Posadas de Puerto Rico As-
sociates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico 8" rejected a first amendment
challenge 82 to the constitutionality of a Puerto Rico statute and regula-
tions that restricted gambling parlor advertising aimed at residents of
Puerto Rico. 8s Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,18 4 stated
176. Id. at 931. The Court stated that cities may regulate adult theaters by dispersing or by
centralizing them, but that it was not the province of the courts to appraise the wisdom of the
method chosen. Id.
177. Id. The Court rejected the contention that the statute was underinclusive for failing to
regulate other adult businesses likely to produce similar secondary effects. Id. The Court stated
that no such businesses were in Renton at the time the statute was enacted and that the city had
not focused on certain theaters for discriminatory treatment. Id. The Court seemed to endorse a
step-by-step approach by stating that the city might "in the future, amend its ordinance to include
other kinds of adult businesses that have been shown to produce the same kind of secondary ef-
fects as adult theaters." Id. at 932. The dissent, on the other hand, stated that, in light of the first
amendment interests at stake, such a gradual approach was inappropriate. Id. at 934 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
178. Id. at 932 (majority opinion).
179. Id. The Court rejected the argument that the 520 acres were not truly available because
the land either was already occupied by existing businesses, not for sale or lease, or not "commer-
cially viable." Id. The Court stated that the theater owners, like any other prospective purchasers,
must fend for themselves in the market for real estate. Id. The dissent, however, indicated that
operators of adult theaters are not on an equal footing with some other potential buyers and les-
sees because theaters must operate under some restrictions not levied on other businesses. Id. at
938 (Brennan, J., dissenting). By denying the theater owners sites for their businesses, the zoning
ordinance was an effective prohibition against a form of protected speech. Id.
180. Id. at 932 (majority opinion).
181. 106 S. Ct. 2968 (1986).
182. The Court noted that Puerto Rico is subject to the first amendment free speech clause.
Id. at 2971 n.1 (citing Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 314 (1922)).
183. Id. at 2971. The Games of Chance Act of 1948 (Act), permits the playing of roulette,
dice, and cards at licensed gambling casinos in Puerto Rico. Id. at 2972 (discussing § 2 of the
Games of Chance Act of 1948, codified as amended at P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 15, § 71 (1972)). Subse-
quent statutes added bingo and slot machines to the Act's list of authorized games. See id. at 2972
(discussing Act of June 7, 1948, No. 21, § 1 (bingo) and Act of July 30, 1974, No. 2, pt. 2, § 2 (slot
198 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:173
that the case involved the restriction of purely commercial speech 85
machines)). The legislative intent underlying legalization of certain forms of gambling was
to contribute to the development of tourism by means of the authorization of certain games of
chance which are customary in the recreation places of the great tourist centers of the world,
and by the establishment of regulations for and the strict surveillance of said games by the
government, in order to ensure for tourists the best possible safeguards, while at the same
time opening for the Treasurer of Puerto Rico an additional source of income.
Id. (citing Games of Chance Act of 1948 § 1, codified as amended at P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 15, § 71
(1972)).
The Act further provides that "'[n]o gambling room shall be permitted to advertise or other-
wise offer their facilities to the public of Puerto Rico.'" Id. (citing Games of Chance Act of 1948
§ 8, codified as amended at P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 15, § 77 (1972)). The government issued two
regulations to implement the advertising restriction in § 8 of the Act. The first, Regulation 76-218,
essentially reiterated the terms of § 8. Id. at 2972 (citing P.R. R. & REGS. tit. 15, § 76-218 (1972)).
The second, Regulation 76a-1(7), as amended in 1971, prohibited gambling casinos from
advertising
to the public in Puerto Rico. The advertising of our games of chance is hereby authorized
through newspapers, magazines, radio, television and other publicity media outside Puerto
Rico subject to the prior editing and approval by the Tourism Development Company of the
advertisement to be submitted in draft to the Company.
Id. at 2972 (quoting P.R. R. & REGs. tit. 15, 76i-1(7) (1972)). The Tourism Company interpreted
these restrictions to prohibit the use of the word "casino" in any manner that might be accessible
to the Puerto Rican public. Id. at 2973. Viewing this interpretation as too broad, the Superior
Court of Puerto Rico issued a narrowing construction of the Act, stating that "the only advertise-
ment prohibited by law originally is that which is contracted with an advertising agency, for con-
sideration, to attract the resident to bet at the dice, card, roulette and bingo tables." Id. at 2973
(quoting the decision of the Superior Court of Puerto Rico).
The Puerto Rican court also set forth a narrowing construction of Regulation 76a-1(7):
Advertisements of the casinos in Puerto Rico are prohibited in the local publicity media ad-
dressed to inviting the residents of Puerto Rico to visit the casinos.
We hereby allow, within the jurisdiction of Puerto Rico, advertising by the casinos ad-
dressed to tourists, provided they do not invite the residents of Puerto Rico to visit the ca-
sino, even though said announcements may incidentally reach the hands of a resident.
[A]ny other situation or incident relating to the legal restriction must be measured
in light of the public policy of promoting tourism. If the object of the advertisement is the
tourist, it passes legal scrutiny.
Id. at 2973-74 (quoting the decision of the Superior Court of Puerto Rico). This narrowing con-
struction ensured that the advertising restrictions would not inhibit the freedom of the press to
report on casino gambling or the freedom of individuals to comment on such matters of public
concern as legislation related to gambling. Id. at 2976 n.7; see Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 n.7 (1985) (stating that Ohio's prohibition against advertising legal
services in Dalkon Shield cases placed no ban on the right to publish facts or express opinions
about Dalkon Shield litigation); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations,
413 U.S. 376, 391 (1973) (holding that the government cannot forbid comments on the ordinance,
commission enforcement practices, or the propriety of gender-based preferences in employment);
Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 64, at 35 n.125 (stating that political dialogue lies at the core of the
first amendment).
184. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
White, Powell, and O'Connor.
185. Pure commercial speech is speech that does "no more than propose a commercial trans-
action." Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
762 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
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and concluded that the principles enunciated in Central Hudson should
guide the first amendment analysis.186 Purportedly applying the four-
pronged Central Hudson test, the Court found first that the commer-
cial speech at issue-the advertising of casino gambling-concerned a
lawful activity, was not misleading, and was therefore entitled to lim-
ited first amendment protection.1 87 Second, the Court determined that
Puerto Rico had a substantial interest in reducing the demand for ca-
sino gambling by its residents in order to protect their health, safety,
and welfare against the harmful effects caused by casino gambling.188
Third, the Court found that because the legislature reasonably believed
that advertising casino gambling to residents of Puerto Rico would in-
crease demand for the service advertised, the challenged restrictions
"directly advance[d]" the asserted governmental interest.18 Fourth, the
Court stated that the restrictions on commercial speech, because they
affected only advertising directed toward residents of Puerto Rico, were
no more extensive than necessary to further the government's interest
in protecting its citizens.1 90 Thus, the statute and regulations passed the
376, 385 (1973)).
186. Posadas, 106 S. Ct. at 2976 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)). For a discussion of the Central Hudson test, see supra notes
103-13 and accompanying text.
187. Posadas, 106 S. Ct. at 2976-77.
188. Id. at 2977. Among the secondary effects cited by the Tourism Company, the agency
empowered to administer the Games of Chance Act, were: "disruption of moral and cultural pat-
terns, the increase in local crime, the fostering of prostitution, the development of corruption, and
the infiltration of organized crime." Id. at 2977 (quoting Brief for Appellee at 37); see City of
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925, 932 (1986) (noting that the city has a substantial
interest in preserving the quality of urban life).
189. Posadas, 106 S. Ct. at 2977; see Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 509
(1981) (plurality opinion) (finding the third part of the Central Hudson test satisfied when the
legislative belief was "not manifestly unreasonable"). For a discussion of the Metromedia standard
of review, see supra note 126 and accompanying text.
190. Posadas, 106 S. Ct. at 2978. The Court rejected the contention that a more appropriate
means of reducing the demand for casino gambling by residents of Puerto Rico would be for the
government to engage in a counterspeech campaign rather than to suppress entirely advertising of
casino gambling directed at residents. Id. First, a determination of the effectiveness of an active
campaign to discourage gambling by publicizing its risks vis-a-vis a restriction on advertising ca-
sino gambling was for the legislature to make. Id. Moreover, the legislature apparently concluded
that despite the Puerto Rican public's awareness of the harmful effects of gambling, the residents
were likely to succumb to gambling if barraged with widespread advertising of the opportunity. Id.
The Court cited approvingly cases restricting alcohol and tobacco advertising. See, e.g., Dunagin v.
City of Oxford, Miss., 718 F.2d 738, 751 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (stating that "[w]e do not believe
that a less restrictive time, place, and manner restriction, such as a disclaimer warning of the
dangers of alcohol, would be effective. The state's concern is not that the public is unaware of the
dangers of alcohol. . . . The concern instead is that advertising will unduly promote alcohol con-
sumption despite known dangers"), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1984); Capital Broadcasting Co. v.
Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 585 (D.D.C. 1971) (asserting that "Congress had convincing evidence
that the Labeling Act of 1965 had not materially reduced the incidence of cigarette smoking"),
aff'd, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
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Central Hudson test of constitutionality, and the Court upheld the
statute's validity."'
The Court distinguished its previous decisions in Carey v. Popula-
tion Services International9 2 and Bigelow v. Virginia'9' by pointing
out that in those cases the underlying conduct subject to the regula-
tions was constitutionally protected.19 4 Gambling, on the other hand,
was an activity that the legislature properly could prohibit.' 95 According
to the Court, the greater power to ban completely casino gambling nec-
essarily encompassed the lesser power to ban the advertising of casino
gambling. Carey and Bigelow were therefore inapposite. 96 The Court
further stated that legislative regulation of products or activities
deemed harmful, such as cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, and prostitu-
tion, traditionally has varied from outright prohibition to legalization of
the products or activities with restrictions on stimulation of their de-
mand. 9 7 Therefore, the Court held the statute and regulations, which
merely regulated advertising, did not facially violate the first
amendment. 98
In his dissent Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and
Blackmun, stated that government suppression of "nonmisleading"
commercial speech relating to legal activities should be subject to
"strict judicial scrutiny"'199 rather than the more relaxed standard ap-
plied by the majority.200 When the government suppressed commercial
expression to deprive consumers of truthful information about lawful
activities, Justice Brennan found no justification for according commer-
cial speech less protection than other types of speech.2 °' Moreover, Jus-
191. Posadas, 106 S. Ct. at 2980.
192. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
193. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
194. Posadas, 106 S. Ct. at 2979. The Court in Carey struck down a prohibition against the
"advertisement or display" of contraceptives. 431 U.S. at 700-02; see supra notes 77-81 and accom-
panying text. In Bigelow the Court reversed a criminal conviction for violating a ban against the
advertising of abortion clinics. 421 U.S. at 829; see supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
195. Posadas, 106 S. Ct. at 2979.
196. Id. The Court stated, "[I]t is precisely because the government could have enacted a
wholesale prohibition of the underlying conduct that it is permissible for the government to take
the less intrusive step of allowing the conduct, but reducing the demand through restrictions on
advertising." Id. (emphasis in original).
197. Id. at 2979-80.
198. Id. at 2980.
199. Id. at 2982 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 2981-82. In support of his statement, Justice Brennan quoted Justice Blackmun's
concurring opinion in Central Hudson:
Even though "commercial" speech is involved, [this kind of restriction] strikes at the heart of
the First Amendment. This is because it is a covert attempt by the State to manipulate the
choices of its citizens, not by persuasion or direct regulation, but by depriving the public of
the information needed to make a free choice. . . . [The State's policy choices are insulated
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tice Brennan stated that the majority was more deferential to the
actions of Puerto Rico's legislature than the Central Hudson intermedi-
ate standard of review warranted.2 02
The dissent questioned the substantiality of the asserted state in-
terest in protecting the residents of Puerto Rico from the effects of le-
galized gambling.203 First, Justice Brennan stated that discouraging
residents from patronizing gambling parlors would not further the goals
asserted in the Games of Chance Act 204-namely, the development of
tourism, protection of tourists, and production of additional revenue.20 5
Second, Justice Brennan asserted that Puerto Rico had not sustained
its burden of proving that the interests the government sought to ad-
vance were substantial.2 0 Specifically, the government failed to demon-
strate that "deleterious consequences" would follow if residents were
encouraged to gamble.07 Third, even assuming a substantial interest in
preventing serious harmful effects, the dissent doubted whether the reg-
ulations would further that interest.208 Justice Brennan pointed out
that Puerto Rico promoted its gambling establishments primarily to
tourists; the problems of organized crime, prostitution, and corruption
would likely persist regardless of whether Puerto Rico's residents were
encouraged to gamble.20 9 Finally, Justice Brennan stated that more lim-
ited measures could be adopted to achieve the same results. Puerto
Rico could step up its monitoring of gambling halls, vigorously enforce
its criminal statues, establish betting limits, and engage in a program of
counterspeech. Such efforts would address the problems perceived by
the government and avoid the first amendment problems posed by gov-
from the visibility and scrutiny that direct regulation would entail and the conduct of citizens
is molded by the information that government chooses to give them ...
Id. at 2982 (quoting Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 574-
75 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
202. Id. at 2982. Justice Brennan wrote:
While tipping its hat to [the Central Hudson] standards, the Court does little more than
defer to what it perceives to be the determination by Puerto Rico's legislature that a ban on
casino advertising aimed at residents is reasonable. The Court totally ignores the fact that
commercial speech is entitled to substantial First Amendment protection, giving the govern-
ment unprecedented authority to eviscerate constitutionally protected expression.
Id. at 2983.
203. Id.
204. For the text of the Statement of Motives in the Games of Chance Act, see id. at n.2
(quoting Games of Chance Act of 1948 § 1, codified as amended at P.R. LAWs ANN. tit. 15, § 71
(1972)); see also supra note 183 (reprinting the legislative history).
205. Id. at 2983 n.2.
206. Id. at 2983-84.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 2984-85.
209. Id. at 2985.
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ernment regulation of protected speech.210 Justice Brennan concluded
that the statute and regulations were unconstitutional and lamented
that the Court's action limits the scope of first amendment protection
available to commercial speech and gives government officials "unprece-
dented authority to eviscerate constitutionally protected expression."21'
IV. ANALYSIS
When a state enacts a content-based restriction on editorial, non-
commercial expression, the Supreme Court employs a strict standard of
review. Consistent with this standard, the Court in Pacific Gas scruti-
nized a public utilities order regulating billing envelope content in an
attempt to determine whether the order was narrowly tailored to serve
a compelling state interest.212 The Pacific Gas decision emphasized cor-
porations' entitlement to the full panoply of first amendment protec-
tions when speaking out on matters of public importance, even though
the speech may affect the entity's economic well-being.1 3 The Court
rejected California's contention that the regulation was a content-neu-
tral time, place, and manner restriction of editorial speech 14 in which
case the applicable test would have been the intermediate scrutiny of
whether the regulation served a significant governmental interest and
left open ample alternative channels for communication.215
The Court employed the intermediate standard in City of Renton
v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. 216 to review the constitutionality of a local
adult theater ordinance. The Court characterized the ordinance as a
mere time, place, and manner regulation; as such, the ordinance was
valid as long as it was designed to further a substantial government
interest and did not unreasonably limit other means of communica-
tion.21 7 The standard adopted by the Court was less stringent than the
test used in Pacific Gas. Had the regulation been enacted for the pur-
pose of restraining speech on the basis of its content,1 " the ordinance
would have been presumptively violative of the first amendment.
219
The Playtime Theatres dissent, however, persuasively argued that
the ordinance would be characterized more appropriately as a content-
210. Id.
211. Id. at 2986.
212. 106 S. Ct. 903, 913 (1986).
213. Abrams, Good Year for the Press, But Not for Advertisers, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 11, 1986, at
S-14, col. 3.
214. Pacific Gas, 106 S. Ct. at 914.
215. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
216. 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986).
217. See supra notes 168-80 and accompanying text.




based restriction because the regulation effectively discriminated
against theaters on the basis of film content.2 0 By characterizing the
ordinance as content-neutral, the majority could support more readily
its deference to city judgment and thereby minimize judicial scrutiny of
a restriction on lawful, albeit controversial, activity.
Judicial treatment of restrictions on noncommercial speech, as ex-
emplified by the Court's opinions in Pacific Gas and Playtime Thea-
tres, closely parallels the analysis of regulations on commercial speech.
In both the commercial and the noncommercial spheres, the Court scru-
tinizes content-neutral regulations less rigorously than content-based
regulations. States, however, have greater flexibility to promulgate re-
strictions on commercial speech than comparable restrictions on edito-
rial expression. The Court accords commercial speech only limited first
amendment protection. Consequently, the Court scrutinizes content-
based restrictions on commercial expression under the four-part inter-
mediate test enunciated in Central Hudson221 and reviews content-neu-
tral regulations under a more deferential standard.222
In accordance with the intermediate standard for content-based
regulations, the Court in Zauderer imposed on the State the burden of
demonstrating that the prohibition of truthful, nondeceptive attorney
advertising directly advanced a substantial governmental interest.223
The Court, however, refused to apply the "least restrictive means"
analysis to strike down disclosure requirements relating to clients' po-
tential liability for legal costs.2 24 Consequently, the Court held that an
220. But see supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
221. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S.
191 (1982); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
222. See Note, supra note 7, stating that:
Under well-established first amendment analysis, a government regulation aimed at the con-
tent of the communication itself, as opposed to a regulation which is content neutral, is pre-
sumptively unconstitutional unless the expression falls within several unprotected categories
of speech. Arguably, a similar distinction may be made in the commercial speech area. Thus,
while a content neutral advertising regulation need only satisfy a rational basis test, a restric-
tion directed at a particular product still should be subject to Central Hudson's intermediate
level of review.
Id. at 783 n.26 (citation omitted); see also Comment, supra note 7, which argues:
Because commercial speech requires less protection than noncommercial speech, the two
levels of review for regulations of commercial expression should be more lenient than the
standards applied in reviewing analogous regulations of noncommercial speech. Content-
based regulations of commercial speech should therefore receive intermediate scrutiny, and
content-neutral regulations should be reviewed even more leniently, perhaps according to the
deferential rational basis test employed in Metromedia.
Id. at 914 (footnotes omitted). For a discussion of the different standards of review, see supra
notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
223. 471 U.S. 626, 642 (1985).
224. "Because the First Amendment interests implicated by disclosure requirements are sub-
stantially weaker than those at stake when speech is actually suppressed, we do not think it appro-
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advertiser's rights are sufficiently safeguarded when the disclosure re-
quirements reasonably relate to a state's interest in preventing
deception.22
When a content-based regulation impinges on advertising the avail-
ability of a lawful activity, the Court apparently concedes the applica-
bility of the stricter Central Hudson test. Nevertheless, when the
underlying activity is controversial in nature, the Court, while purport-
ing to apply the Central Hudson standard, recently has exhibited
greater deference to local decisionmaking. In Posadas the prohibition
against casino advertising to residents of Puerto Rico was based on a
fear that the content of the messages would encourage residents to
gamble. Faced with a content-based regulation, the Court was obliged
to apply the Central Hudson test. The Court, however, applied the test
loosely, especially the fourth prong, which requires a state to demon-
strate affirmatively that a more limited regulation would not achieve
the asserted legitimate governmental interest.22 The Court refused to
consider a "counterspeech campaign" as an alternative means of serving
Puerto Rico's interest because the Court regarded the adoption of such
a measure as a matter for the legislature. Instead, the Court unques-
tioningly accepted Puerto Rico's characterization of its own ordinance
as the least restrictive means of achieving the governmental objective.227
The Court's rationale in Posadas is troublesome. That a state may
impose, with minimal judicial scrutiny, outright prohibitions on
nondeceptive advertising of the availability of a lawful activity or prod-
uct creates serious doubts about the continued viability of first amend-
ment protection of commercial speech.228 The Court's decision in
Posadas appears to retreat to the position in Valentine v. Chrestensen
that commercial advertising is wholly unworthy of constitutional pro-
priate to strike down such requirements merely because other possible means by which the State
might achieve its purposes can be hypothesized." Id. at 652 n.14.
225. Id. at 651.
226. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 190 and accompanying text; see also Welkowitz, The Posadas Adven-
ture: Commercial Speech Treading Water in Rough Constitutional Seas, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 5, 1986,
at 5, col. 2 (stating that "[t]he greater willingness to defer to unsubstantiated legislative judgment
is a great contrast to Central Hudson and other commercial speech cases.. . . [T]he majority had
deemed mere assertions of governmental interest, without record evidence to support them, to be
sufficient. In prior cases, the burden was placed on the government to substantiate its interest").
228. One commentator, however, has distinguished the outright prohibition against casino
advertising aimed at residents of Puerto Rico from proposals to ban cigarette and alcoholic bever-
age advertising altogether. The former is a partial restriction, while the latter would accomplish a
total ban. That commentator contends that Virginia Board, rather than Posadas which is prece-
dent for only a partial ban, provides the relevant constitutional standard for such measures. See
Kmiec, The Wrong Solution, 72 A.B.A. J., Dec. 1, 1986, at 39.
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tection.2 12 In fact, Justice Rehnquist, who authored the opinion in
Posadas, previously had expressed a desire to return to Chrestensen in
his dissenting opinions in Virginia Board,30 Bates,231 and Central
Hudson.3 2
The Court's apparent shift to a more deferential standard of review
for content-based prohibitions on commercial speech relating to a law-
ful, though not constitutionally protected, activity or product poses
broad and potentially harmful ramifications. Advocates of a total ban
on tobacco advertising already are relying on Posadas to support their
contention that such a measure is constitutional.2 3 Moreover, because
the Constitution protects so little commercial activity from legislative
prohibition, the Posadas logic enables a state to enact wholesale bans
on the advertising of any politically vulnerable product.3 The govern-
ment, for example, could rely on the Posadas rationale to justify not
only prohibitions on tobacco and alcohol advertising promulgated to
protect public health and safety, but also bans on foreign car advertise-
ments enacted to decrease the demand for foreign cars and reduce the
trade deficit.23 5 Thus, the Court appears to have left the choice of
whether to suppress expression almost entirely to state and local discre-
tion, subject to only minimal judicial scrutiny.
V. CONCLUSION
Central to the first amendment is the assurance of a free flow of
information to facilitate enlightened public decisionmaking. Commer-
cial speech, because it alerts individuals to the availability of products
and services, promotes rational decisionmaking in the economic arena.
Fostering the free exchange of ideas in the marketplace is an important
value that should not be compromised by judicial deference to paternal-
istic regulations that seek to decrease the demand for a lawful good or
service by sheltering citizens from receiving information about its avail-
ability. Rather, the Court should adhere firmly to the intermediate
229. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 115.
233. The Court in Posadas cited as support its decision in Capital Broadcasting Co. v.
Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), alI'd, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972), upholding a ban on the
broadcast advertising of cigarettes. 106 S. Ct. at 2980 n.10; see Synar, A Habit That Kills, 72
A.BA J., Dec. 1, 1986, at 38. See generally Roberts, Curbs on Tobacco, Alcohol Ads Boosted, L.A.
Daily J., July 8, 1986, at 5, col. 1 (stating that the Posadas decision "sent lawyers and lobbyists for
the tobacco, alcohol, and advertising industries scrambling to define the holding narrowly and de-
flect the hinted support for curbing such messages").
234. See Mercurio, Commercial Speech: Court Takes Step Backward, Legal Times, July 28,
1986, at 4, col. 1.
235. See Welkowitz, supra note 227; see also Mercurio, supra note 234.
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standard of scrutiny set forth in Central Hudson. When determining
the constitutionality of a content-based ban on nondeceptive advertis-
ing of a lawful activity, the Court should scrutinize the regulation to
ensure that it is no more extensive than necessary to further a substan-
tial governmental interest.
Mary B. Nutt
